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Constructing q-cyclic Games with 
Unique	Prefixed	equilibrium
abstract:  In this work we construct a wide family of q-cyclic n-person games 
(Marchi and Quintas (1983)) with unique prefixed Nash equilibrium points. We 
extend the constructions given for bimatrix games by Marchi and Quintas (1987) 
and Quintas (1988 a). We prove the uniqueness of equilibrium for a wide family 
of completely mixed  q-cyclic game and  also for a family of not completely mixed 
q-cyclic game, with each players having n strategies, being only m (m<n) of them 
active strategies.
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1 Introduction
The concept of equilibrium introduced by Nash (1951) is considered a landmark in 
non-cooperative game theory. The set of Nash equilibrium points is non-empty for any 
finite game if mixed strategies are allowed (Nash (1951)).
However in general there is a multiplicity of equilibrium. It is an important problem 
to decide which equilibrium is taken as a solution of the game. If the players cannot 
communicate each player might choose an equilibrium strategy and the resulting play 
might not be an equilibrium1. Even if they can communicate, it still remains a serious 
problem because the utilities can be quite different from one equilibrium point to another. 
This problem does not arise if the equilibrium is unique
Many studies have been done on uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points. On one 
hand it was studied some sufficient conditions to guarantee uniqueness (Gale y Nikaido 
(1965))2. it has been also studied  under what conditions it is possible to construct games 
with predetermined unique equilibrium predetermined. Constructions of games with 
prefixed unique equilibrium have been done for bimatrix games by Raghavan (1970). He 
proved that, if the equilibrium points of a game are completely mixed then the matrix 
of each player is square and the equilibrium is unique. Millham (1972) proved that a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a game with unique prefixed 
equilibrium points is that the equilibrium be completely mixed. Kreps (1974) gave 
uniqueness conditions when the equilibrium point is not completely mixed. Heuer 
(1979), extended and complemented these results and obtained the uniqueness of the 
equilibrium point within the class of mixed strategies whose non zero components 
are the same for all the players. Quintas (1988 a) b)) extended this result constructing 
a wide family of bimatrix games with unique equilibrium point.  Marchi and Quintas 
(1987) also studied games with prefixed values and unique equilibrium points. Quintas, 
Marchi, Giunta and Alaniz (1991) extended this construction for other family of games 
with unique equilibrium points.
In this work we extend the above mentioned constructions, presenting a wide family 
of q-cyclic n-person games with unique equilibrium.  We give some definitions and 
basic results in Section 2. We built the payoff matrices of a family of n-person games in 
Section 3 and we prove the uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Section 4.  We extend 
the constructions of games with unique equilibrium when it is non-completely mixed 
in Section 5.  We also include some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Definitions and Previous Results
Here we give some definitions, notations and review some results which will be 
used in this paper.
Definition 2.1 (Marchi - Quintas (1983)). Let  n21n21 A,.......,A,A,Σ,.....,Σ,ΣΓ  , 
be a finite n-person q-cyclic game in normal form, were i  is the set of pure strategies 
for player i. Let Ai be the utility function of player i, with i=1,...n.  The definition of 
the function Ai is given by:     iqiini1i σ,σBσ,.......,σ,.....,σA   with ii   were the 
function q  is that: q(i) ≠ i    and q-1(i ) = 1 were. stands for the cardinality of 
respective set .
In this work we consider games where:, q(i ) = i+1  mod. n , we take  j = q( i ) and 
each player has  m strategies, thus mΣi   ,  for i=1,.....,n
Definition 2.2: A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over the pure 
strategies  imiii  ,,........., 21  . That is a vector:       imi2i1imσii2σii1σii ,......xx,xx,.......,x),(xx   
were i
tx  is the  probability of player I uses his strategies  with  t = 1,2,.....,m.
1 This problem does not appear in two       
person zero sum games because for this 
type of games the equilibrium could 
not be unique, but the equilibrium 
strategies are interchangeable and the 
equilibrium payoff is unique.
2 There is also a vast bibliography on       
refinements of the Nash Equilibrium. 
Some refinements reduce the multi-
plicity of equilibrium. 
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Definition  2.3: Let be i

  the set  of mixed strategies for the player i .






 



m1,2,.....,t0,xwith1x:x it
mt
1t
i
tii
  




ni
1i
in21 ,......xx,xx  is a n-tuple of mixed strategies for the n players and we
denote     n* 1ii* 1-i*1i-N x,....,x,x,x,.......,xx ix,*
Definition 2.4 (Marchi - Quintas  (1983)). The expected utility function Ei  for each 
player  i, in the q-cyclic game is  defined as follows:  
   q(i)iii x,xFxE    where Fi  is the expected utility  function of Bi .
Thus, we have     itjl
ml
1l
mt
1t
ij
tljiii xxax,xFxE 




  with i=1, 2,......,n
We will indistinctly denote it by:    jriji x,eFxr,F  , where  er  is a m-tuple with 
one in the place r and zero in the other places. 
Definition 2.5: (Nash (1951)). A   




nt
1t
*
n
*
2
*
1
* ,......xx,xx t n-tuple  is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if )()( i{i}N
*
i
*
i x,xExE   for each  x i
 ∈ i

  ;  and for each i=1,… ,n.
We will use the following characterization on Nash Equilibrium 
Definition 2.6: The set of all the pure strategies, that are best reply against 
  




nt
1t
tn21 ,......xx,xx  , is defined  as follows: 
 )()(:Σx
iq(i)j
Σ
i
t
σx,
i
t
σ
i
x,
i
r
σ
ii
i
r
σ
q(i)
FF
i
J m1,2,....,with t)(  eachfor
We will use the following characterization of equilibrium points: 
Theorem 1: (Marchi - Quintas  (1983)).   




ni
1i
in21 ,......xx,xx  is a  Nash 
equilibrium, if and only if,    q(i)ii xJxS   , for each  i = 1,2,....., n. where 
   m1,2,...,s0x:ΣσxS i
sj
i
si
 with  is the support  of the mixed  strategy  xi.
Definition 2.7:   




ni
1i
in21 ,......xx,xx  is completely mixed if jj Σ)S(x   . In this case, 
we say each player has all the strategies active.
Definition 2.8: Let   




nt
1t
t
*
n
*
2
*
1
* ,......xx,xx  be a Nash Equilibrium of 

. We say 
that v1, v2,......,  vn ,  where  vi = Ei(x
* ), i=1,2,....,n., are expected values associated to 
  




nt
1t
t
*
n
*
2
*
1
* ,......xx,xx
3 Construction of the payoff  matrices of the players
We will present a general form of n-person q-cyclic games with prefixed equilibrium 
points on the mixed extension.  
We will construct the payoff matrices Ai  with  i=1,2,...,n for each player i, and we 
will study under what conditions on the expected utility function Ei  there is a unique 
equilibrium.
Let us consider an arbitrary point,   




ni
1i
in21 ,......xx,xx
It is         nmn2n12m22211m1211n21 x,........,x,x.......,........x,........,x,x,x,........,x,xx,,.........x,x   with 
1x
mt
1t
i
t 


 for each i=1,2,....,n , 0xit   for each  t=1,2,....,m and   i=1,2,.....,n
Thus,  ixS  = m   for i=1,2,....n. 
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We choose arbitrary non zero values v i  with  i=1,.......,n. They will be the expected 
payoffs of the game  
The construction extends that presented for bimatrix games by   Quintas (1988 a)). 
It consists in giving conditions in order that the region of the simplex j

  limited for a: 
predetermined vertex, the above prefixed point x and some points chosen on the faces 
of the simplex, have a unique maximizing hyperplane.
Thus, we take into consideration the prefixed point   jjmj2j1j Σ,......xx,xx   and the 
simplex´s vertexes es , having  one in the place  s and zero in the other places.
We choose s points having the following form:  
)(
j
m
j
1s
j
1
j
2
j
1
s
j x,......,x0,,x,......,x,xx





 s  with  s=1,2,......m
The point 
s
jx

 is  on a face  of  simplex j

 , and we  obtain  it by extending the segment 
between  es and xj., until it reaches  the opposite face to the  corresponding vertex.  
This is made in order to obtain a polyhedral partition of the simplex j

 , having as 
extreme points: the m  vertices of simplex j

 , the m points 
s
jx

 and the prefixed  point 
xj . (Marchi and Quintas (1987) studied   characterizations of these points on some  n-
person games). 
The geometric idea laying behind the construction of the payoff matrixes consists 
in analyzing which is the “maximizing hyperplane” in each subset of the  simplex 
partition.  We want to have a unique “maximizing hyperplane”  in each region (see 
next figure when  )
In order to obtain 
s
jx

   we use the following equation:
  s
jsj
s
s
xexλe


As the s-th component of 
s
jx

 is zero, then we have:    01xλ1 jss 
Thus 0
x1
1
λ
j
s
s 

  , and it follows that: 
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y
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For each vertex er ∈ i

  and for each xj ∈ j

  , by definition 2.6  we obtain:    
  tjrijl
ml
1l
ij
rlji xAxaxr,F  


, 
where Ari  is the r-th row of the matrix Ai  of player i  and 
t
jx  is the  transposed  of   xj.
On the hyperplane  ji xr,F  we require the following properties:
 It should take the value  vi on   jjmj2j1j Σ,......xx,xx  ,  . That  is: 
   itjrijl
ml
1l
ij
rlji vxAxaxr,F 


 In each point 
s
jx

 with s= 1, 2,.....,n, it should take the value isi εv   , with 
i
s
ε  > 0  . 
Namely.
 
Then  �va
x1
1 i
si
ml
l
1l
ij
j
s

 



s
rl
Now we introduce a bijective function  fji in order to complete the definition of player 
i  payoff matrix.
r(s)f,ΣΣ:f
jiijji
   such that  iji v)x(r,F 
(where r is the  index of the corresponding maximizing hyperplane)
This implies that:
   st,Faasr,F iijtsijrsi     for each   it


Thus, by definition 2.4 we have:   ijrsi asr,F   and by theorem 1 we obtain: 
    sfeJ jisi  . In this way in each vertex of j

  there is a unique maximizing hyperplane 
and  fji distributes the different  hyperplanes on the different  vertices. 
We also prescribe that each t, such as fji(t)≠r, the fji(t)-hyperplane,  “passes underneath” 
the fji(s)-hyiperplane at  each point 
s
jx

 . Moreover we ask it takes the values i
si εv  .
Thus, for each r ≠ fji(t).
i
si
ml
sl
1l
j
l
ij
rlj
s
ml
1l
s
l
ij
rl εvxa
x1
1
xa 

 
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




                                >









ml
sl
1l
j
l
ij
(s)lfj
s
ml
1l
s
l
ij
(s)lf xax1
1
xa
jiji
Thus for r=1,2,...,m in the point  jmj2j1j x,........,x,xx   we prescribe that all the 
hyperplanes  take the same  value vi.    This is, for   r =1,2,...,n,        
i
ml
1l
j
l
ij
rl vxa 


And for each t such that fji(t) ≠ r 
i
ti
j
t
ij
rt
3l
1l
j
l
ij
rsj
t
εvxaxa
x1
1












 


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Then, we have the following system:  
 























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

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1
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Solving it, we have: 
 
 













r(s)ffor
x
εx1
v
r(s)fforx1ε
x
1
v
a
jij
s
i
s
j
s
i
ji
s(t)f
j
t
i
tj
s
i
ij
rs
ji
Remark 1: 
 As 1x0 js   the coefficients are well defined.
 As fji(s) = r, then iijrs va   . 
 As  fji(s) ≠ r; then iijrs va   .
These two inequalities agree with the geometric idea leading the whole 
construction.
 The payoff matrix Ai is non singular, its determinant is: 
   
n321
i
1-n
ms
1s
i
s
i
i
......x.x.xx
v
εx1Adet
s






 


And as i
s
ε  are arbitrary positives numbers,   0εx1
ms
1s
i
s
i
s



. Furthermore,  vi is 
not null, then   0iAdet  .
4 Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium
We check here that the point   




ni
1i
in21 ,......xx,xx , with 0jsx  for s= 1,..., m , is 
a Nash Equilibrium. It is so, because it fulfills the inclusions given, in Theorem 1
   q(i)ii xJxS  ,  for each  i = 1,2,....., n
As all the hyperplanes of player i take the same value vi
  in the point xj  , and taking 
into account that i
ml
1l
j
l
ij
rl vxa 


 ; then      iji xSn2,.......,1,xJ  .
Thus, the construction presented  in the previous section guarantees the existence 
of a completely mixed Nash Equilibrium (x1, x2,......., xn)   for a  q- cyclic game Γ with 
payoff matrix Ai for player i.
Theorem 2: Given 
        nmn2n12m22211m1211n21 x,........,x,x.......,........x,........,x,x,x,........,x,xx,,.........x,x 
with 1x
mt
1t
i
t 


 for each  i=1,2,....,n   with 0xit   for each  t=1,2,....,m  and for each 
i=1,2,.....,n;  and values nonzero   v1, v2,...,vn. And given the functions  , 
with  j= i+1 mod.n  and positives numbers isε  with i=1, 2, ,....,n.
There exists a q-cyclic game  Γ  having (x1, x2,......., xn) as a completely  mixed Nash 
Equilibrium with payoff values v1, v2,...,vn 
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We will prove that the family of games we constructed in the previous section has 
  




nt
1t
tn21 ,......xx,x  as unique Nash Equilibrium.
Given the payoff matrices A1, A2,.......,An  for the corresponding players, we choose 
functions jif  and   fulfilling that for each   jj''' xΣΣr,r   :
If       r''r'fΦthen'r'r'fΦ jiji    (1)
with ji ΣΣ:Φ   resulting of the  compositions  of  functions of the type jif .
Remark 2:  
 These conditions are similar to those given for Bimatrix games by Quintas (1988 b),
 In a 3-person game, player 1 plays with player 2, and condition (1) takes the 
form:
 For each   22''' xΣΣj,j   :
 If      j''j'fΦthen'j'j'fΦ 2121  
 In this case  1332 ffΦ   .
 The functions    rr jif   and    mmod.1 rr   fulfill condition (1).
 Moreover, if we choose positive number is  we have that:  
   0εx1
ms
1s
i
s
j
s



 (2)
This implies that the payoff matrix of each player i is non singular. 
We will use the following notation: 
  tjx  is the  transposed vector of  xj.
   tiiii .........vvvV   is a (mx1) matrix with  v in all entries.
 jiA  is the j-th row of player i payoff matrix
Theorem 3:
Given a q-cyclic  game  Γ  constructed as in Theorem 2, having  (x1, x2,......., xn)  as 
a completely  mixed Nash Equilibrium, with non zero values  v1, v2,...,vn ,   and given 
functions fji fulfilling condition (1)  and given positive numbers 
i
sε  with i=1, 2, ,....,n 
fulfilling condition (2) , then,  (x1, x2,......., xn) is the unique Nash  Equilibrium of  the 
game  Γ.
Proof: 
In order to prove the uniqueness, we  assume that there exists another Nash 
Equilibrium (y1,y2,.......,yn) with values ui , thus we have the expected utilities 
Ei(y1,y2,.......,yn) = u i  for  i=1,2,...n.
We will consider the following cases:
 Case 1:  (y1,y2,.......,yn)  is completely mixed
As it is a Nash Equilibrium it  fulfills the systems:
    UyAVxA itjiitji 
Multiplying each equation of system a) by ui , and multiplying each equation of system 
b) vi and subtracting one system from the other we obtain:
  0vuA ii  tjij yx    being 0  the (mx1)-order null matrix. 
The matrices Ai are non singular, because vi≠ 0 and 
i
pε  fulfills condition (2) (see remark 
1), Thus the lineal homogeneous systems   0vuA iii  tjj yx  has unique solution, namely 
the trivial. 0vu  jiji yx , It implies that, 
j
s
j
s yx ii vu   with s=1,2,.......m. 
Summing up over s we obtain:    





ms
1s
1
ms
1s
1 vu
j
s
j
s yx
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As  xj and  yj 
  are  probability vectors, then ui = vi , therefore:    titi AA jj yx   thus 
  0A ti  jj yx  and as Ai is non singular then  the system has unique solution 0yx jj   , 
and thus jj yx   for each  i=1,2,.....,n
 Case 2:  The point  (y1, y2,......., yn)  fulfills  that:
   ii xSyS   with i ∈   {1,2,.......,n}, excepting for  some j ∈   {1,2,.......,n}, such that
   jj xSyS   with  j≠i
We assume that  ,0y,.......,y......,,y,yy i 1-mjkj2j1j   and   kkf ji 
Let    jj ySxSk   , 
  
 
 
 




jj
32
ySs
j
si
s
i
s
i
s
ySs
j
si
t
j
kf
i y
x
x1ε
yvyA
Let  iySr   
  
 
   
 
 








rs
ySs
ms
rs
1s
j
s
i
sj
r
j
rj
si
s
i
s
i
s
ySs
j
si
t
j
rf
i
jj
ji x1ε
x
y
y
x
x1ε
yvyA
Subtracting    tjrfi yA ji   y    tjkfi yA ji   we obtain:
 
   
   
 
  







 


  





 jjjj ySs
j
si
s
i
s
i
s
ySs
j
si
rs
ySs
ms
rs
1s
j
s
i
sj
r
j
rj
si
s
i
s
i
s
ySs
j
si y
x
x1ε
yvx1ε
x
y
y
x
x1ε
yv , 
That is: 
           






ms
1s
j
s
i
sj
r
j
rj
rj
r
j
r
i
r
ms
rs
1s
j
s
i
sj
r
j
rt
j
kf
i
t
j
rf
i x1ε
x
y
y
x
x1ε
x1ε
x
y
yAy jijiA
We have:    0


ms
1s
j
s
i
s x1ε   y   jySr 
      0 tjkfitjrfi yAy jijiA , implies that     jiji yJkf   . 
Thus (y1, y2,......., yn) is an Equilibrium point, because:    jii yJyS   (Theorem 1)  , 
then    iySkfji   , and in  consequence   0y
i
kf ji   ., but that is   impossible because by 
hypothesis, we had that )S(x)S(y ii  , and thus  (x1, x2,......., xn)  is a point completely mixed 
Equilibrium, which implies that     mxSyS ii  . 
In consequence,    jj xSyS   for all j=1,2,...., n and then by case 1, jj yx   therefore 
(x1, x2,......., xn) is unique equilibrium.
 Case 3:  The point (y1, y2,........, yn) fulfills  that:
   n2,...,1,iallforyS)S(x ii 
Let    nn ySxSk  . In this case, we suppose k =m    kkf nn 1 , 
In case 2, we obtained    0y -1nnf 
1n
k , thus 01-nmy .
Let   )S(yxSj 1-n1-n  , by hypothesis we had    1-n1-n xSyS  , in this case j = m satisfies 
that condition.
Let     121  jjf nn  mod.m,
      t1-nf 2-n yA 1-n jn 2   
 
 
 




1-n
'
1-n yS
1-n
s
s
1-n2-n
s
ySs
1-n
s2-n yy
x1ε
yv
s
Let  'ySr  , 
    
 
 
 
 






ms
rs
1s
1-n
s
2-n
s1-n
r
1-n
r
yS
1-n
s1-n
s
1-n
s
2-n
s
ySs
1-n
s2-n
t
1-n
f
2-n
x1ε
x
y
y
x
x1ε
yvyA
1-n1-n
1-n
s
rn 2
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By subtracting     t1-n
rf
2-n yA
2n1-n   from      t1-n
f
2-n yA
1-n jn 2   we obtain, as in the previous
case that:           t1n
jf
2-n
t
1-n
rf
2-n yAyA
2n1-n2n1-n

  , then      1221   nnnn yJjf  . 
As we have that (y1, y2,........, yn) is an equilibrium     1n2-n2-n yJyS    (Theorem 1), then 
     2-nyS jf nn 21 , and in consequence,     0y
2-n 
 jf nn 21  , that is 0y 2-n1  .
Let    11 ySxSi  , and we consider  f1n(i) =i 
Working as in the previous cases we obtain  that    1n1n yJif   . 
Again as (y1, y2,........, yn) is an equilibrium    1nn yJyS   (Theorem 1), then    n1n ySif  , 
and in consequence:   0y
n
if1n
 , that is is 0yn1  .
Now choosing    nn ySxSk  , such that:          n1-nn211n ySkfφffkL  ,  
The  existence of such  k, is  guarantied by  (1).
For  k= m,   1mL 
  
 
 
 




11 yS
1
s1
s
1
s
n
s
ySs
1
sn
'
1 yx
x1ε
yvyA
s
tkL
n
and for each  r such that         11-nn21 ySrfφfrh  , in consequence,   1rΦ 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 









ms
rs
1s
1
s
n
s
rh
1
rh
yS
1
s1
s
1
s
n
s
ySs
1
sn1 x1ε
x
y
y
x
x1ε
yvyA
11
hrhs
s
trL
n 1
)(
 i
Subtracting   trLn 1yA  from   tL 1kn yA  ,  we obtain:
         
 
 



ms
1s
1
s
n
s1
rh
1
rht
1
kL
n
t
1
rL
n x1ε
x
y
yAyA
This is positive because    1ySrh   and   0x1ε
ms
1s
1
s
n
s 


Thus,         t1kLnt1rLn yAyA   (3)
However,  k is such that    1ySkL   , and as  (y1, y2,........, yn)  is an  Equilibrium, then 
   1nn yJyS   (Theorem 1), we have   
     t1kLnt1rLn yAyA  . (4)
But the inequalities (3) and (4) are incompatible, unless   0y
1
rh   .
If this occurs the vector y1 is the null, and this is an absurd, thern there exist no other 
equilibrium of the game Γ. It completes the proof.
5 Constructing Matrices of n- Players  Cyclic Game of  with Unique 
Points  non Completely Mixed Equilibrium 
In this section we consider cyclic games having the following characteristics: Each 
player have  mi  strategies, ii mΣ   with i=1, 2,........, n, and  each player have  m strategies 
actives. 
Without loss of generality we can consider that the  positives components of each 
vector xi  i=1,2, ...., n, are  the first m for  each player.
Let  v1, v2,......,vn , be n arbitrary nonzero values and let (x1, x2 , ......,xn)  be a  n- tupla 
of probability  vectors   were each  vector xi is equal to:
      imi2i1σii2σii1σii ii im ,......xx,xx,.......,x),(xx  .
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We will construct matrices A1, A2,........,An, with the following  form:
Ai = 



















ij
mm
ij
km
ij
1m
ij
km
ij
kk
ij
k1
ij
1m
ij
1k
ij
11
jiii
j
j
aaa
|||||
aaa
|||||
aaa
for  i=1,2,...n  ; j= i+1 mod. n
We denote with  the following submatrices of  size mxm:
m
iA  = 












ij
mm
ij
m1
ij
1m
ij
11
aa
|||
aa
We define the elements of the  submatrices  for  i=1,2,...n as follows:
 
 













r(s)ffor
x
εx1
v
r(s)fforx1ε
x
1
v
a
jij
s
i
s
j
s
i
ji
r(t)f
j
t
i
tj
s
i
ij
rs
ji
here with  p=1,...,m  are positive numbers 
We choose bijective functions  fji   y   , such that: 
fj i : S(xj )→S(xi )    y    Φ: S(xi )→S(xj )
fulfilling   condition (1) given in  section 4.
We split the construction in 3 different areas as shown 
I II
III
 In  I it places the submatrix miA
 In  II a submatrix of size  m x (mj -m), were the  elements are chosen arbitrarily.
 In III a  submatrix of size  (mi – m) x mj, we chose q rows of Ai  with imqm   
. We denote ir with qiA  , and it fulfills that   qitjqi vxA   for a suitable qiv  with iqi vv   
for i=1,.....n 
We denote with:
 ix

  is the vector  imiii xxxx ,.......,, 21

 consisting of the first m  components of xi.
   )S(m,2,........1,Σmi ix   with  i=1,2,....,n.
  mnm2m1mnm2m1
m
A,.....,A,A,Σ,,,,,Σ,ΣΓ    is the n-person game, 
Now we make the verification that 




 
n21 x,.....,x,x  is the unique Nash Equilibrium, of  , 
and  v1, v2,.....,vn  are the values of the game  (Definition  2.8).
In view of above construction the matrix Ai have the following properties: if we can 
choose the q-th row qiA  with imqm  ,  and: 
  qitqi vA jx   for suitable qiv  ,  fulfilling  that:  iqi vv    i=1,.....n .
Therefore ,  it  verifies that:
  iti VA jx    for    tmi1miiiii iv,........,v,v,........,v,vV 
with  i = 1, 2,....., n.
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In consequence,   (x1,x2,.....,xn) is an equilibrium of the game 

.
Just at the realized in the previous section, now it exists a q- cyclic game Γ  no 
completely  mixed, with payoff matrix  Ai  and values v1, v2,...,vn   having   (x1, x2,......., xn) 
as equilibrium of the game 

. Therefore, it was proved the following theorem:
Theorem 4:  Give a n-tupla:
       ,0,....,0x,........,x,x......,,........,0.......0x,........,x,x,,0,0,.......x,........,x,xx,,.........x,x nm,n2n12m22211m1211n,21 
with  1x
mt
1t
i
t 


  for each  i=1,2,....,n   with  0xit    for each t=1,2,....,m and each  i=1,2,.....,n; 
where each  vector xi ,  has mi positive components with i=1, 2,...,n  and  v1, v2,...,vn are non zero 
values   Let fji and Φ be functions  fulfilling condition (1) , were 
i
sε  , with i= 1, 2,.., n .are  positive 
numbers. 
Then there  exists a q-cyclic game  Γ, having (x1, x2,......., xn)  as unique non completely  mixed 
equilibrium,  and being  v1, v2,...,vn  are the corresponding values of the game.
Remark 3: In the way we construct the matrices A1, A2,......, An the new rows we included 
are strictly dominates, then  n,21 x,,.........x,x  will still be a unique equilibrium.
5.1 Uniqueness of the Point of Equilibrium of Nash
Theorem 5: Give a q-cyclic game  Γ  constructed as in  Theorem 1, then (x1, x2,......., xn) 
is the unique equilibrium of the game.
Proof: In order to prove the uniqueness we assume that  (y1, y2,.......,yn)  is another 
equilibrium.
Taking into account conditions (2), (3) and Theorem 2,  it is sufficient  to prove the 
case when: 
S( x ) = S(y)
As (y1,  y2, . . . . . . . ,yn)  is  an equil ibrium, i t  fulf i l ls  that :    i
t
ji UA y ,  where 
 tmi1miiiii u,........,u,u,.......,u,uU i , for suitable qiu  such that: iiqi mqmwithuu   , 
i = 1,2,.....,n,
Then:
  tiiitmi u.,,.........u,uA 



 
jy   With i=1,2,...n
Where 

jy  is the corresponding  truncated vector of y  with respect to its m first 
components. 
As   (x 1,  x2 , . . . . . . . , x n)   i s   a l so  an  equi l ibr ium,  then:    i
t
i VA jx  where 
 tmi1mqiiii v,........,v,v,........,v,vV i ,  for suitable qiv , such that: iqi vV   for imqm   with 
i=1,2,.....,n,
Then  
 ii
t
m
i v.,,.........v,vA i




 
jx  with i= 1,..., n.
where  jx

  is the corresponding  truncated vector of  jx
Choosing  functions fji  and Φ fulfilling condition (1); and  positive numbers ip  
with  p=1,...,m, then, we are in the hypothesis of Theorem 2. Therefore the point 
 n,21 x,,.........x,x   is the unique equilibrium.  
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6 Concluding remarks 
In this work we presented a wide family of q-cyclic n-person games with unique 
prefixed Nash equilibrium points. We extend the constructions given for bimatrix games 
by Marchi and Quintas (1987) and Quintas (1988 a). We also proved the uniqueness of 
equilibrium for a wide family of completely mixed  q-cyclic game and  also for a family 
of not completely mixed q-cyclic game, with each players having n strategies, being only 
m (m<n) of them active strategies. 
This is a step in extending results from 2 person games to n-person games. We  might 
have  expected that the procedure used here could also serve to generate games with 
unique equilibrium in Polymeric Games (Yanovskaya E. B (1968)). These games are an 
extension of q-cyclic games, but unfortunately the technique we used, didn’t provide 
unique equilibrium in Polymeric Games and it would require the use of a different 
technique.
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